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 The decision to invest in stocks requires not only an assessment of the risk-return trade-oﬀ
given the existing data, but also an act of faith (trust) that the data in our possession are
reliable, that the overall system is fair. Episodes like the collapse of Enron may change not only
the distribution of expected payoﬀs, but the fundamental trust in the system that delivers those
payoﬀs. Most of us will not enter a three-card game played on the street, even after observing
a lot of rounds (and thus getting an estimate of the “true” distribution of payoﬀs). The reason
is that we do not trust the fairness of the game (and the person playing it). In this paper
we claim that for many people (especially people unfamiliar with ﬁnance), the stock market is
not intrinsically diﬀerent from the three-card game. They need to have trust in the fairness
of the game and in the reliability of the numbers to invest in it. We focus on trust to explain
diﬀerences in stock market participation across individuals and across countries.
We deﬁne trust as the subjective probability individuals attribute to the possibility of being
cheated. This subjective probability is partly based on objective characteristics of the ﬁnancial
system (the quality of investor protection, its enforcement, etc.) that determine the likelihood of
frauds such as Enron and Parmalat. But trust reﬂects also the subjective characteristics of the
person trusting. Diﬀerences in educational background rooted in past history (Guiso, Sapienza,
and Zingales (GSZ), 2004a) or in religious upbringing (GSZ, 2003) can create considerable
diﬀerences in levels of trust across individuals, regions, and countries. This diﬀerence between
subjective and objective beliefs can persist because learning about the true probability of a very
rare event takes very long time.
These individual priors play a bigger role when investors are unfamiliar with the stock
market or lack data to assess it. But they are unlikely to fade away even with experience and
data. If trust is suﬃciently low, very few will participate and accumulate enough information
to update a (possibly wrong) prior. Furthermore, when mistrust is deeply rooted, people may
be doubtful about any information they obtain and disregard it in revising their priors. For
example, data from a 2002 Gallup poll show that roughly 80 percent of respondents from some
Muslim countries (Pakistan, Iran, Indonesia, Turkey, Lebanon, Morocco, Kuwait, Jordan, and
Saudi Arabia) do not believe that Arabs committed the September 11 attacks (Gentzkow and
Shapiro, 2004).
1To assess the explanatory power of a trust-based explanation we start by modelling the
impact of trust on portfolio decisions. Not only does the model provide testable implications,
but it also gives us a sense of the economic importance of this phenomenon. In the absence of
any cost of participation, a low level of trust can explain why a large fraction of individuals do
not invest in the stock market. In addition, the model shows that lack of trust ampliﬁes the
eﬀect of costly participation. For example, if an investor thinks that there is a 3% probability
that he will be cheated, the threshold level of wealth beyond which he invests in the stock
market will increase ﬁve folds. The calibration of the model shows that the existing level of
mistrust among investors is suﬃciently severe to account for the lack of participation of some
of the richest investors in the United States as well as for diﬀerences in the rate of participation
across countries.
To test the model’s predictions we use a sample of Dutch households. In the Fall of 2003
we included some speciﬁc questions on trust, attitudes towards risk, ambiguity aversion, and
optimism to a sample of 1,943 Dutch households as part of the annual Dutch National Bank
(DNB) Household survey. These data were then matched with the 2003 wave of the DNB
Household Survey, which has detailed information on households’ ﬁnancial assets, income, and
demographics. We measured the level of generalized trust by asking our sample the same
question asked in the World Values Survey (a well-established cross country survey): “Generally
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you have to be very careful in
dealing with people?”.
We ﬁnd that trusting individuals are signiﬁcantly more likely to buy stocks and risky assets
and, conditional on investing in stock, they invest a larger share of their wealth in it. This eﬀect
is economically very important: trusting others increases the probability of buying stock by
50% of the average sample probability and raises the share invested in stock by 3.4 percentage
points (15.5% of the sample mean).
These results are robust to controlling for diﬀerences in risk aversion and ambiguity aversion.
We capture these diﬀerences by asking people their willingness to pay for a purely risky lottery
and an ambiguous lottery. We then use these responses to compute an Arrow-Pratt measure of
individual risk aversion and a similar measure of ambiguity aversion.
2Since these measures are not statistically signiﬁcant, however, one can still wonder whether
trust is not just a better measured proxy of risk tolerance. To dispel this possibility we look at
the number of stocks people invest in. In the presence of a per-stock cost of investing, our model
predicts that the optimal number of stocks is decreasing with an individual risk tolerance but
increasing in the level of trust. When we look at the Dutch sample, we ﬁnd that the number of
stocks is increasing in trust, suggesting that trust is not just a proxy for low risk aversion.
Trust is also not just a proxy for loss aversion, which in Ang et al.’s (2004) framework can
explain lack of participation. First, more loss-averse people should insure more, but we ﬁnd
that less trusting people insure themselves less. Second, Osili and Paulson (2005) shows that
immigrants in the United States, facing the same objective distribution of returns, invest or not
in stock as a function of the quality of institutions of the country they are coming from. This
is consistent with the evidence (GSZ 2004a and 2005) that individuals tend to extrapolate the
trust of the environment where they are born to the new environment in which they live. It is
not clear why loss aversion should follow this pattern.
We also want to ascertain that trust is not a proxy for other determinants of stock market
participation. For example, Puri and Robinson (2005) ﬁnd that more optimistic individuals
(individuals who expect to live more) invest more in stock, while Dominitz and Manski (2005)
ﬁnds, consistent with Biais et al. (2004), that an individual’s subjective expectations about
stock market performance is also an important determinant.
We control for diﬀerences in optimism across individuals by using the answers to a general
optimism question we borrowed from a standard Life Orientation Test (Scheier et al., 1994).
We control for diﬀerences in expectations thanks to a speciﬁc question on this topic that was
asked to a subsample of the households. When we insert these controls, the eﬀect of trust is
unchanged.
The measure of trust that we elicit in the DNB survey is a measure of generalized trust.
But stock market participation can be discouraged not only by general mistrust, but also by a
mistrust in the institutions that should facilitate stock market participation (brokerage houses,
etc.). To assess the role of this speciﬁc trust we use a customer survey conducted by a large
Italian bank, where people were asked their conﬁdence towards the bank as a broker. Also in
3this case we ﬁnd that trust has a positive and large eﬀect on stock market participation as well
as on the share invested in stocks.
That lack of trust - either generalized or personalized – reduces the demand for equity
implies that companies will ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to ﬂoat their stock in countries characterized
by low levels of trust. We test this proposition by using cross country diﬀerences in stock
participation and ownership concentration. We ﬁnd that trust has a positive and signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the stock market participation and a negative eﬀect on the dispersion of ownership.
These eﬀects are present even when we control for law enforcement, legal protection, and legal
origin. Hence, cultural diﬀerences in trust appear to be a new additional explanation for cross
country diﬀerences in stock market development.
We are obviously not the ﬁrst ones to deal with limited stock market participation. Doc-
umented in several papers (e.g., Mankiw and Zeldes, 1991; Poterba and Samwick, 1995, for
the US, and Guiso et. al., 2001, for various other countries), this phenomenon is generally
explained with the presence of ﬁxed participation costs (e.g. Haliassos and Bertaut, 1995;
Vissing-Jørgensen, 2003). The ﬁnding that wealth is highly correlated with participation rates
in cross-section data supports this explanation. But “participation costs are unlikely to be the
explanation for nonparticipation among high-wealth households.” (Vissing-Jørgensen, 2003 p.
188, see also Curcuru et al., 2004).
While independent from ﬁxed costs, our trust-based explanation is not alternative to it. In
fact, the two eﬀects compound. The main advantage of the trust-based explanation is that it is
able to explain the signiﬁcant fraction of wealthy people who do not invest in stocks. Accounting
for this phenomenon would require unrealistic level of entry costs. By contrast, since mistrust
is pervasive even at high level of wealth (the percentage of people who do not trust others
drops only from 66% in the bottom quartile of the wealth distribution to 62% at the top), the
trust-based explanation can easily account for lack of participation even among the wealthiest.
Furthermore, as Table 1 documents, the fraction of wealthy people who do not participate
varies across countries. Explaining these diﬀerences only with the ﬁxed cost of entry would
require even more unrealistic diﬀerences in the level of entry costs. By contrast, we will show
that trust varies widely across countries and in a way consistent with these diﬀerences.
4Our trust-based explanation is also related to recent theories of limited stock market par-
ticipation based on ambiguity aversion (e.g. Knox, 2003). When investors are ambiguity averse
and have Gilboa-Schmeidler “max-min” utility, they may not participate even if there are no
other market frictions, such as ﬁxed adoption costs (Dow et al., 1992, and Routledge and Zin,
2001). The two explanations, however, diﬀer both from a theoretical and a practical point of
view.
¿From a theoretical point of view, the diﬀerent nature of the two explanations can be appre-
ciated from brain experiments (Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec, 2004; McCabe et al., 2001;
Rustichini et. al., 2002). This evidence shows that when individuals are faced with a standard
trust game, the part of the brain that is activated is the “Brodmann area 10”; while when they
have to choose among ambiguous and unambiguous lotteries, the part activated is the “insula
cortex.” The “Brodmann area 10” is the area of the brain related to people’s ability to make
inferences from the actions of others about their underlying preferences and beliefs, and is thus
the one that rests on culture. The “insula cortex” is a part of the brain that activates during
experiences of negative emotions, like pain or disgust, and is mostly related to instinct.
At the practical level, our trust-based explanation has several advantages. First, if we are
interested in predicting stock market participation, models based on ambiguity aversion are
less promising. Ambiguity aversion is a parameter of the utility function, which is very hard
to measure and hard to explain on the basis of other factors. Other interesting explanations
of limited participation in the stock market share similar limits. For example, Ang et al.
(2004) provide an explanation based on Disappointment Aversion Preferences. Unfortunately,
measuring the degree of disappointment aversion in large samples is diﬃcult. By contrast,
an individual level of trust is a prior that has been measured for several decades in sociological
surveys and has been linked to the individual personal history and the community the individual
lives in.
Second, even if measures of ambiguity aversion or disappointment aversion could be obtained
and used to explain diﬀerences in participation across individuals, in the literature there is no
study showing that aversion to ambiguity or disappointment aversion diﬀer systematically across
countries. While it is possible that preferences are aﬀected by cultural heritage (see GSZ, 2005),
5evidence of diﬀerences across country of these preference parameters do not exist. To the
contrary, trust, being partly determined by cultural diﬀerences, can vary systematically across
countries (as it actually does) and can thus potentially explain international diﬀerences in stock
market participation.
Third, since trust is the necessary act of faith we have to do when we are not properly
informed or we do not understand what is going on, the need for trust is negatively correlated
with information and education. More informed people rely less on trust and so do more
educated people. There is not an analogous implication in the literature based on ambiguity
aversion.
Last but not least, our model based on trust seems to capture in a simpler and more realistic
way the reluctance some people show toward investing in the stock market.
Finally, our trust-based explanation provides a new way to interpret the growing evidence
that familiarity breeds stock market investments. Empirically, there is evidence that investors
have a bias to invest in stocks of companies they are more familiar with. For example, Huberman
(2001) shows that shareholders of a Regional Bell Operating Company (RBOC) tend to live
in the area served by the RBOC. Similarly, Cohen (2005) documents that employees bias the
allocation of their 401-K plan in favor of their employer’s stock, possibly because they view their
employer’s stock as safer than a diversiﬁed portfolio (Driscoll et al., 1995). Traditionally, these
ﬁndings have been interpreted as evidence of Merton’s (1987) model of investors with limited
information. An alternative interpretation, consistent with our model and several papers in the
literature (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999, 2001) is that there is a strong correlation between trust
and local knowledge. This correlation can be the result of a causal link ﬂowing both ways. On
the one hand, more knowledge, as we show in this paper, overcomes the barrier created by lack
of trust. Hence, mistrust will be less of an obstacle in investing in local stocks. On the other
hand, trust facilitates the collection of information and dissemination of information, as the
famous Paul Revere example demonstrates.1 Accordingly, our model is consistent with Hong,
1When Paul Revere took the midnight ride in 1775 to inform his fellow citizens that the British were coming,
he mounted enough support to defeat them in Concord and begin the Revolutionary War. At the same moment
another Bostonian, William Dawes tried to convey the same message but he was unsuccessful even though he met
more people during his nocturnal ride (see Hackett Fisher, 1995). The diﬀerence between the Paul Revere and
6Kubrick, and Stein (2004)’s ﬁndings that more social individuals (who go to church, visit their
neighbors, etc.) are more likely to hold stocks, since social individuals exhibit more generalized
trust (GSZ, 2003).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 shows the implications of introducing a
problem of trust in a standard portfolio model. It also derives the diﬀerent implications trust
and risk aversion have when it comes to choosing the optimal number of stocks in a portfolio.
Section 2 describes the various data sources we use and the measures of trust, risk aversion,
ambiguity aversion, and optimism in the DNB survey. Section 3 presents the main results on
the eﬀect of generalized trust obtained using the DNB survey. Section 4 discriminates between
trust and risk aversion, while Section 5 focuses on the eﬀects of trust toward an intermediary.
Cross country regressions are presented in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
1 The model
To illustrate the role of trust in portfolio choices, we start with a simple two-asset model. The
ﬁrst one is a safe asset, which yields a certain return rf . The second asset, which we call stock,
is risky along two dimensions. First, the money invested in the company has an uncertain
return e r, distributed with mean r > rf and variance σ2. Second, there is a positive probability
that the stock might become worthless for reasons that are orthogonal to the return of its real
investment. We are purposefully vague on what this event might be: the possibility the company
is just a scam, that the manager steal all the proceeds, or that the broker absconds with the
money instead of investing it. For simplicity, we collectively refer to all these possible events
as “the ﬁrm cheats” and we label with p the subjective perceived probability this might occur.
Consequently, we identify the complementary probability (1 − p) with the degree of trust an
investor has in the stock. While p is clearly individual-speciﬁc, for simplicity in our notation we
omit the reference to the individual. Finally, to highlight the role of trust we start by assuming
zero costs of participation.
William Dawes was that Paul Revere was a well connected silversmith, known and trusted by all to be highly
involved in his community. Thus, people trusted his message and followed him while ignored Dawes’ message
(see Gladwell, 2000).
7Given an initial level of wealth W, an individual will choose the share α to invest in stocks
to maximize his expected utility:
Maxα(1 − p)EU(αe rW + (1 − α)rfW) + pU((1 − α)rfW).
where the two terms reﬂect the investor’s utility if respectively no cheating or cheating occurs.
The ﬁrst order condition for this problem is given by
(1 − p)EU0(αe rW + (1 − α)rfW)(e r − rf) ≤ pU0((1 − α)rfW)rf. (1)
The LHS is the expected marginal utility of investing an extra dollar in the risky asset, which
yields an excess return e r −rf with probability (1−p). This must be less or equal to the cost of
losing all the investment if cheating occurs. If at α = 0 the cost exceeds the beneﬁt, than it is
optimal to stay out of the stock market. This will happen if p > p where p, the threshold of p
above which an individual does not invest in stocks, is deﬁned as p = (r−rf)/r. It follows that
Proposition 1 Only investors with high enough trust ((1 − p) > (1 − p)) will invest in the
stock market.
An interesting feature of this model is that the necessary condition for stock market partic-
ipation does not directly depend on wealth. Hence, provided that trust is not highly correlated
with wealth (a condition we will verify), this model can explain lack of participation even at
high levels of wealth.
Suppose that p is below p = (r − rf)/r, then (1) will hold as an equality and will deﬁne
the optimal share α∗ > 0. Lowering trust marginally (i.e., increasing p), will reduce the left
hand side of (1) and increase the right-hand side. To re-establish optimality the optimal share
invested in stocks should adjust. Since, given concavity of the utility function, the left-hand
side of (1) is decreasing in α while the right-hand side is increasing, α has to decline. Hence,
we have
Proposition 2 The more an investor trusts, the higher his optimal portfolio share invested in
stocks conditional on participation.
8This result can be seen more clearly if we assume investors have an exponential utility with
coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion θ and e r ∼ N(r,σ2). In this case, their optimal α would be
α∗ =
( r − rf)
θWσ2 −
prf
(1 − p)AθWσ2
where A = e−θ(α∗rW−θ(α∗W)2σ2)
Note that the ﬁrst term of this equation is the optimal α when there is no fear of being
cheated (p = 0). Since A is a strictly decreasing function of α∗, as p increases (trust decreases),
the optimal level of investment in stock drops.
1.1 Calibration
The previous section shows that lack of trust can theoretically explain the lack of stock-market
participation of many investors. But is this explanation realistic? To address this question we
calibrate the model, ﬁrst without any cost of participation and then with it.
Without any cost of participation, the condition for participation is provided by (1). If we
plug the U.S. values of this parameters (the average rate of return on stocks in the post war
period has been about 12% and that on government bonds about 5%) an individual will not
participate if his subjective probability of being cheated is greater than (r − rf)/r = (1.12 −
1.05)/1.12, about 6.25%.
Is this a realistic ﬁgure? Though we have no direct estimate of the perceived probability of
being cheated, we can try to infer it from the trust they exhibit towards large companies. This
information is available through the World Value Survey, where individuals are asked how much
conﬁdence they have in major companies. Survey participants can answer in one of four ways:
“Great deal”, “Quite a lot”, “Not very much” and “Not at all”.
Column (1) in Table 2 reports the fraction of individuals who do not have conﬁdence at all
in major corporations. In the United States this proportion is 7.2% in Sweden only 6%, while
in Italy 18.6%. These ﬁgures alone cannot account for all the people who do not invest in the
stock market in these countries (34% in Sweden, 51% in the United States, and 92% in Italy).
If we assume, however, that also the second group (i.e., people who state they do not have
“very much” conﬁdence in major corporations) attributes at least a 6.25% probability of being
9cheated, then the magnitudes are much more comparable. In Sweden the fraction of people
with limited trust is 46%, in the United States 49%, and in Italy 50%.
Alternatively, if we accept the view that the lack-of-participation puzzle exists only for the
very wealthy people, we should focus on the top 5% of the wealth distribution. Here, the
magnitudes are much more comparable. In Sweden only 2% of the more wealthy people do not
trust “at all” major corporations and correspondingly only 4% of the rich does not invest in
the stock market, similarly for the United States (respectively, 6% and 4%). But in Italy where
29% of the richest people do not trust major corporations, 35% of them does not invest in the
stock market!
The above results suggest that mistrust alone can explain much of all the lack of participation
puzzle. The combination of trust and ﬁxed cost of participation, can do even better. As Table 2
shows these explanations are not mutually exclusive. While in most countries richer people tend
to trust large companies a little more, even among the top income deciles there is a substantial
proportion of individuals who do not trust at all large companies. In fact, in Italy the fraction of
people who do not trust large corporations at all is even larger among the wealthy than among
the poor.
To assess the impact of combining the two explanations, we introduce trust in a ﬁxed cost
of participation model ` a la Vissing-Jørgensen (2003). Hence, we assume that if an individual
wants to invest in stocks he has to pay a ﬁxed cost f and allocate between the two assets only
the remaining wealth W − f. If p exceeds p = (r − rf)/r the investor will not participate,
whatever the value of the participation cost, but now the level of trust required to participate
is higher the higher the participation costs because investing in stocks becomes relatively less
attractive, as f increases.
Introducing trust in a model with cost of participation changes the wealth threshold for
investing too. The perceived risk of being cheated decreases the return on the stock investment,
making participation less attractive. To see this eﬀect, suppose 0 < p < p and let α∗ be the
optimal share invested in stocks if the investor decides to pay the ﬁxed cost. It is worthwhile
for an investor to pay f and invest in stock if participation yields a higher expected utility than
10staying out of the stock market and investing the whole wealth in the safe asset, i.e. if
(1 − p)EU(α∗e r(W − f) + (1 − α∗)rf(W − f)) + pU((1 − α∗)rf(W − f)) > U(rfW)
Let α∗
p denote the optimal portfolio share if the investor participates when the probability of
being cheated is p ∈ [0,1] and b rp the certainty equivalent return on equity deﬁned implicitly by
EU(α∗
pe r(W −f)+(1−α∗
p)rf(W −f)) = U(α∗
p b rp(W −f)+(1−α∗
p)rf(W −f)). Then, we have
Proposition 3 For any probability of being cheated p, there exists a wealth threshold Wp that
triggers participation given by
Wp = f
α∗
p b rp + (1 − α∗
p)rf
α∗
p(b rp − rf)
and Wp is increasing in p.
Proof: See Appendix.
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is very simple. When an investor perceives a probability
of being cheated, the eﬀect of a ﬁxed cost increases because he has to pay the participation
cost in advance, but expects a positive return only with probability 1 − p. Hence, the actual
participation cost becomes inﬂated by 1
1−p.
Introducing trust, thus, ampliﬁes the eﬀect of participation costs. But how sensitive is the
wealth threshold to (small) deviations from the full trust hypothesis? To answer this question in
Table 3a we report how much the threshold level of wealth has to increase, when the perceived
probability of being cheated changes. The calculations have been made by assuming an investor
with exponential utility, an initial wealth level equal to 1, a relative risk aversion of 5, a ﬁxed
cost of participation equal to 0.1 percent of wealth and r = 1.12 and rf = 1.05.
Even a perceived probability of being cheated as small as 0.5 percent raises the wealth
threshold by 25 percent of its value when trust is full. If the perceived probability of being
cheated is 2 or 3 percent, the wealth threshold for participating is respectively 2.7 times and
5.2 times larger than if individuals perceived no risk of cheating.
To assess the practical impact on participation of an increase in the threshold level of wealth,
in Table 3, Panel B, we report the ratio of the 75th and 90th percentile of the distribution of
ﬁnancial assets to its median in four countries for which we have micro data (United States,
11France, Italy and the Netherlands). The way to use this information is as follows. Based on
Table 2, it is plausible to assume that when p = 0 the costs of participation are such that
every investor with wealth below the median never participate in the stock market. In a high-
trust country such as the United States, roughly 50% of household invests in the stock market
(Table 1). By contrast, in a low-trust country such as Italy only 8.2% of the population invests
in stock. So to explain why more than 90% of the population in Italy does not invest in stock
we need to argue that lack of trust increases the threshold of wealth to participate from the
median (like in the States) to above the 90th percentile. By looking at Table 3B we know this
implies almost a seven fold increase. Is this plausible? By looking at Table 3A we see that a
seven fold increase requires an increase in the probability of being cheated going from zero to
4%. Given that the percentage of Italians who do not have any trust in major companies is
almost 2.5 times bigger than in the States, this diﬀerence in the perceived probability of being
cheated is very reasonable.
This result is very important and suggests that our model explains why people with a lot
of wealth in the United States do not participate. Table 3a shows that the people who have
8.6 times the median wealth non-participation will occur if the probability of being cheated for
these individuals is above 5%. The fraction of wealthy people in the United States that have no
conﬁdence in large companies (Table 2) is well in the range of 5%.
In summary, lack of trust always reduces stock market participation, but the strength of
this eﬀect depends upon the presence of participation costs. In the absence of any participation
cost, lack of trust discourages stock investments only because it reduces their expected return.
When participation is costly, lack of trust reduces the return on equity investments in two
additional ways: it lowers the optimal share invested in stocks conditional on participation and
it lowers the expected utility from participating because it reduces the expected return of stock
investments. Thus, paying the ﬁxed costs to enjoy the equity premium becomes less rewarding
in the presence of mistrust.
121.2 Diversiﬁcation, trust, and risk aversion
Given the diﬃculties in obtaining a reliable measure of individual risk aversion, it will be im-
portant to establish in the empirical analysis that trust is not just a proxy for risk tolerance.
To do so, we need to devise some theoretical implications where the eﬀect of trust diﬀers from
the eﬀect of risk aversion. This is the case for the optimal number of stocks held.
1.2.1 The two stock case
Suppose there are just two risky stocks (1 and 2) in the economy (hence in this example for
simplicity we assume away the risk free asset), which are equally and independently distributed
with returns e r1 ∼ N(r,σ2) and e r2 ∼ N(r,σ2). Each stock also has a probability p of “cheat-
ing” and yielding a zero return. The probability of “cheating” is equal for the two stock but
independent of each other.
To make the problem interesting, we assume that there is a cost c per stock that investors
have to incur.2 If an investor puts all his money in the ﬁrst stock his expected utility will be
(1 − p)EU(f W1) + pU(0) − c (2)
Since there is another stock, he can diversify by investing part of the money also in the
second stock. Given that the two stocks are identically distributed, if he invests in both the
optimal allocation is half of his wealth in each. The investor’s expected utility from investing
in both assets is:
(1 − p)2EU(
1
2
f W1 +
1
2
f W2) + p2U(0) + p(1 − p)EU(
1
2
f W1) + p(1 − p)EU(
1
2
f W2) − 2c (3)
Subtracting (2) from (3), the investor will buy the second stock if
(1 − p)[D + pV ] > c (4)
where
D = EU(1
2f W1 + 1
2f W2) − EU(f W1)
2As Curcuru et al. (2004) argues the lack of diversiﬁcation remains a puzzle. One way to explain this puzzle
is to posit some per stock cost of diversiﬁcation.
13V = [EU(1
2f W1) + EU(1
2f W2)] − [EU(1
2f W1 + 1
2f W2) + U(0)]
The term D measures the standard beneﬁt of diversifying the idiosyncratic risk, which
materializes regardless of any possibility of cheating. For a risk-averse investor this term is
strictly positive and increasing with his degree of risk aversion. By contrast, the term V can be
thought of as the beneﬁt of diversifying away the risk of being cheated. Notice that in (4) V is
multiplied by the probability of being cheated. Hence, V is the beneﬁt of having invested in two
stocks rather than one if cheating in at least one stock (but not both) occurs. The ﬁrst term
in squared brackets is the payoﬀ an investor receives if he has diversiﬁed the risk of cheating
across the two stocks. If cheating occurs only in stock 1 he gets EU(1
2f W1), while if it occurs
only in stock 2 he gets EU(1
2f W2). By contrast, if an investor is diversiﬁed with respect to the
idiosyncratic risk but not with respect to the risk of cheating (this could occur if the investor
buys a mutual fund which is diversiﬁed and the risk of cheating is at the mutual fund level),
then he gets EU(1
2f W1 + 1
2f W2) half of the times and U(0) the remaining half.3
The investor will diversify into the second stock if the LHS of (4) exceeds the cost of buying
the second stock (assuming that he has already invested in the ﬁrst, so that (1) is positive). It
is easy to see that an increase in risk aversion increases the term D and thus makes it more
likely that the investor buys the second stock.
But we are also interested in how a change in trust aﬀects the decision. Since (1−p)(D+pV )
represents the total expected beneﬁts from diversiﬁcation, when trust increases (the probability
of being cheated p decreases) we have two eﬀects. First, the importance of the total beneﬁts
from diversiﬁcation increases (since all the beneﬁt are multiplied by (1−p)), but the beneﬁt of
diversifying the risk of being cheated (V ) becomes less important (because it is multiplied by
p). Hence, we have
Proposition 4 Diversiﬁcation will always be non decreasing in trust if D > V .
Proof : The derivative of the LHS of (4) is −D + (1 − 2p)V , which is always negative for
D > V .
The intuition is straightforward. When we increase p (decrease trust) we lose some beneﬁt
3In the event both stocks cheat, the payoﬀ is U(0) regardless of the diversiﬁcation strategy.
14of diversiﬁcation (pD) and gain others ((1 − p)pV ). If D > V the beneﬁts of diversiﬁcation are
always decreasing in p and hence higher trust will always lead to more diversiﬁcation.
Taking a second order approximation around W = 0, it is easy to show that D ' −
U00(0)σ2
4 >
0 (from concavity) and V ' 0. Hence, while it is possible, in extreme situations, that diversiﬁ-
cation my decrease in trust, in general a higher level of trust makes it more likely to invest in
the second stock.
Another suﬃcient condition for diversiﬁcation being always increasing in trust is that the
beneﬁt from the standard diversiﬁcation is bigger than the cost:
Proposition 5 The incentives to diversify will always non decrease with trust if an investor
would have diversiﬁed in the absence of any trust issue (i.e., D > c).
Proof : If D > c, the LHS of (4) will be greater than c at p = 0. Since the LHS of (4) is a
concave function, if it starts above c at p = 0, it will cross c at most once as p increases. Hence,
the investor will go from diversifying (for low values of p) to not diversifying (for high values of
p).
1.2.2 The general case
We can now extend this line of reasoning to the case where there are n stocks. Suppose utility
is exponential as before. Each of the n stocks an investor can pick yields the same return which
is iid with e ri ∼ N(r,σ2). As before there is a diversiﬁcation cost: adding one stock costs c in
utility terms, so that if an investor buys n stocks he pays a total diversiﬁcation cost of nc.
Each stock will pay out only with probability (1 − p), where p is equal across stocks and
independent from stock to stock. If the investor decides to invest in n stock he will put 1/n of
his wealth W in each stock and solve the problem:
Maxn
n X
g=0
Cg
npg(1 − p)n−pE

−e
−θ(W/n)
g
￿
i=1
￿
ri

 − cn (5)
where g is the number of stocks on which he has invested and that paid out and C
g
n = n!
g!(n−g)! is
the probability that g stocks pay out (where we adopt the convention that
n−g P
i=1
e ri = 0 when
15g = n,). The above expression already reﬂects the fact that if an investor is cheated on stock j
, he loses all the money invested in that stock.
Since e r is normally distributed, the above problem can be written as
Maxn
n X
g=0
C g
n pg(1 − p)n−p
h
−egθ(W/n)r+ 1
2g2θ2(W/n)2σ2i
− cn.
The coeﬃcient multiplying the square bracket term is the coeﬃcient of a binomial term raised
to the n power. Hence, we can rewrite this expression as
Maxn −
h
p + (1 − p)e−θ(W/n)r+ 1
2θ2(W/n)2σ2in
− cn.
Let Z =
h
p + (1 − p)e−θ(W/n)r+ 1
2θ2(W/n)2σ2 i
, then the ﬁrst order condition for (5)can be
written as
−Zn
￿
logZ +
Z − p
Z
(θ
W
n
r − θ2(
W
n
)2σ2)
￿
= c
As we show in Appendix, this equation has a solution, since the limit of the LHS tends to
∞ as n −→ 0 and tends to 0 as n −→ ∞. Since the function is continuous, the intermediate
value theorem ensures that the ﬁrst-order condition has at least one interior solution.
Unfortunately, this condition is suﬃciently complex that it is not easy to do comparative
static analytically. We can, however, resolve it numerically for diﬀerent values of the parameters
and plot the solution. This is what we did in Figure 1. The graph plots the optimal number
of stocks as a function of the level of trust, measured by 1 − p, for diﬀerent values of the risk
aversion parameter. Not surprisingly, the optimal number of stocks increases for higher levels of
risk aversion. More importantly, the optimal number of stocks also increases with trust. Trust
and risk tolerance, thus, have the opposite prediction in terms of number of stocks. Hence, we
can try to distinguish them empirically.
2 The main data
Our main data source is the 2003 wave of the DNB Household Survey, which collects informa-
tion on a sample of 1,943 Dutch households (about 4,000 individuals). The survey, sponsored
16by the Dutch National Bank, is administered and run by Center at Tilburg University. The
purpose of this survey is to collect household level data to study the economic and psychological
determinants of households savings behavior.4 All members of the households at least 16 years
old are interviewed. Appendix B provides details about the survey design and contents, while
Table 4 the main summary statistics.
The survey is particularly useful for our purpose as it has a rich description of the house-
hold assets, real and ﬁnancial, including investment in stocks, distinctly for stocks of listed
and unlisted companies and held directly or indirectly through mutual funds and investment
accounts.
2.0.3 Measuring trust
In the Fall of 2003 we had the opportunity of submitting to the DBN panel a short questionnaire
speciﬁcally designed to obtain individual measures of trust, attitudes towards risk and ambiguity
as well as indicators of optimism. This questionnaire was submitted to about half the DNB panel
and thus information is available for 1,990 individuals belonging to 1,444 households.
To elicit trust we use a question routinely asked in the World Values Survey questionnaires:
“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you
have to be very careful in dealing with people?”
Individuals could answer in one of three ways: (a) most people can be trusted; (b) one has
to be very careful with other people; (c) I don’t know.5 In our analysis we will deﬁne trust as
4Interviews are done via computer through the internet. If a household does not own a computer nor have
access to the internet, Center provides a set-top box and if necessary a television set that can be used to ﬁll
in questionnaires. This feature allows Center to interview the panel occasionally after the main survey has
been conducted and collect additional data on some topic of interest. In the main survey, participants are
submitted seven questionnaires covering diﬀerent areas: general information on household demographics; home
and market work; housing and mortgages; health conditions and income; ﬁnancial assets and liabilities; economic
and psychological attitudes and work and home.
5To avoid that the answers to this question be driven by the order with which the possible answers are
presented, half of the sample was randomly faced with a reverse ordering (that is option (b) was oﬀered ﬁrst and
option (a) second). The average answers of the two samples are very similar, suggesting that there is no response
order bias.
17a dummy variable equal to 1 if individuals choose option (a). On average, 37.7 percent of the
respondents answer this way.
For trust to be able to account for the puzzling lack of participation at high levels of wealth
it must be the case that it does not increase too much with wealth. Table 4D shows the average
level of the two measures of trust by quartile of ﬁnancial assets. While trust increases with
wealth, consistent with ﬁndings in other surveys (GSZ, 2003; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2003),
the change is mild: in the bottom quartile, 2/3 of the individuals state that one has to be very
careful when dealing with people, while in the top quartile this fraction drops to 61 percent.
Thus, even among the wealthy a substantial fraction have a low level of trust.
2.0.4 Measuring risk and ambiguity aversion
To obtain a measure of risk and ambiguity aversion we asked individuals to report their will-
ingness to pay for a lottery. First, we oﬀer them the following unambiguous lottery:
Risky lottery: “Consider the following hypothetical lottery. Imagine a large urn
containing 100 balls. In this urn, there are exactly 50 red balls and the remaining 50
balls are black. One ball is randomly drawn from the urn. If the ball is red, you win
5000 euros; otherwise, you win nothing. What is the maximum price you are willing
to pay for a ticket that allows you to participate in this lottery?”
Then we oﬀer them an ambiguous one:
Ambiguous lottery: “Consider now a case where there are two urns, A and
B. As before, each one has 100 balls, but urn A contains 20 red balls and 80 blacks,
while urn B contains 80 reds and 20 blacks. One ball is drawn either from urn A or
from urn B (the two events are equally likely). As before, if the ball is red you win
5000 euros; otherwise, you win nothing. What is the maximum price you are willing
to pay for a ticket that allows you to participate in this lottery?”
Clearly, risk aversion implies that the price they are willing to pay for the ﬁrst lottery is
lower than the expected value of the lottery, i.e. 2,500 euros. The good news is that only 4
individuals report a price higher than 2,500 euros. The bad news is that the sample average
18is extremely low (112 euros). While extreme, this low willingness to pay is not unusual. It is
a well-known phenomenon in experimental economics: individuals asked to price hypothetical
lotteries (or risky assets) tend to oﬀer very low prices (Kagel and Roth, 1995: 68-86). Given
this downward bias in the reported willingness to pay, our risk aversion measures are likely to be
biased upward. We have found no reference on whether the magnitude of the bias is correlated
with observable individual characteristics. If the bias is constant across individuals, measured
risk aversion is just a scaled up version of the true one.
To map these prices into a risk aversion measure we assume that individuals have a CARA
utility with risk aversion parameter θ and infer the coeﬃcient of risk aversion from the indiﬀer-
ence condition between the price oﬀered and the risky lottery.
To get a measure of ambiguity aversion, or more precisely in our context, of aversion to
compounded lotteries, we use a similar approach based on the utility function developed by
Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2005). The details of these calculations are contained
in Appendix C.
In some preference representations ambiguity aversion and pessimism are, to some extent,
intertwined.6 To disentangle the two eﬀects on portfolio decisions as well as distinguish trust
from optimism we introduced in the questionnaire also a qualitative question meant to capture
6We have also computed an alternative measure of ambiguity aversion based on the preference speciﬁcation
of Ghirardato et. al (2004), who develop a general version of what is commonly called the Hurwicz (1954) α
-maxmin criterion which mainly consists in weighting extreme pessimism and extreme optimism when making
decisions under ambiguity. The general preference representation is of the form:
v(x) = a(x)min
π∈Π
Eπu(x) + (1 − a(x))max
π∈Π
Eπu(x)
where Eπu(x) is the expected utility of x under the probability distribution π. a(x) is what Ghirardato et al.
(2004) call the index of ambiguity aversion, which they allow possibly to depend on the choice variable x. The
utility v(x) here is a weighted average of the utility derived by a purely ambiguity averse agent (minπ∈Π Eπu(x))
and that of a purely ambiguity lover agent (maxπ∈Π Eπu(x)). The weights being a(x) and (1−a(x)). Ambiguity
aversion depicted by (minπ∈Π Eπu(x)) reﬂects extreme pessimism, the agent acts according to the worst case
probability measure π in Π. And likewise, (maxπ∈Π Eπu(x)) reﬂects extreme optimism. This is why, as Hurwicz
(1954) himself describes it, the index a(x) is closer in terms of interpretation to an index of pessimism rather
than ambiguity aversion. But to the extent that pessimism and ambiguity aversion are intertwined, it may be
also interpreted as an index of ambiguity aversion.
19an individual’s degree of optimism. In doing so we follow the standard Life Orientation Test,
very diﬀused in psychology (Scheier et al., 1994), and ask individuals the following question: We
now present you with the following statement. “I expect more good things to happen to me than
bad things.” Individuals have to rate their level of agreement/ disagreement with the content of
the statement, where 1 means they strongly disagree and 5 strongly agree.
Table 4c shows the cross correlation between trust, risk aversion, ambiguity aversion and
optimism.
3 Results
3.1 The eﬀect of generalized trust on stock market participation
We start by analyzing the impact of trust on the decision to invest in stock. Since portfolio
decisions are likely to involve the entire household, we look at the eﬀect of trust on households’
portfolio decisions. It is not obvious, however, how to aggregate individual measure of risk
aversion and trust into a household measure. In the reported estimates, we use the attitudes
reported by the household head as the attitude of the entire household. The results using
household averages or using all individual level data are very similar.
Table 5 reports the probit estimates obtained using the DNB survey. The left-hand side
variable is a dummy equal to 1 if a household invests directly (i.e. not through a mutual fund) in
stocks of listed or unlisted companies and zero otherwise. Here and in the subsequent deﬁnitions
investment in stock does not include investment in equity of own business for those who have
one.7 In this as well as the subsequent regressions we control for a number of variables. First,
since the literature on ﬁxed costs emphasizes the importance of wealth, we include both the value
of household ﬁnancial wealth and income. Then, we include various demographic characteristics
to account for possible diﬀerences in participation costs. We insert a male dummy, the number
of adults and the number of children in the household, two dummies for middle and high
education, and a dummy for being an employee. We also control for the household head’s age
(both linear and linear and squared), to capture changes over the life cycle. These variables
7Trust issues should obviuosly be irrelevant for equity investment in an individual own business.
20may also capture diﬀerences across individuals that aﬀect their attitude toward investment in
stocks - such as variation in exposure to uninsurable risks (Kimball, 1993) - or that act as a
barrier to participation in the stock market regardless of any participation cost, such as lack of
awareness of stock as an asset (Guiso and Jappelli, 2005).
The ﬁrst column reports the estimates of the basic speciﬁcation, where we insert both trust
and risk aversion. While risk aversion turns out to have little predictive power, the eﬀect of
trust is positive and highly statistically signiﬁcant.8
Trusting others increases the probability of direct participation in the stock market by
6.5 percentage points. This is a remarkable eﬀect as it corresponds to a 50% increase in the
unconditional probability of participation.
The second column includes the measure of ambiguity aversion. In spite of the fact that
ambiguity aversion and trust are - as shown in Table 4 - negatively correlated, the coeﬃcient of
trust is hardly aﬀected while ambiguity aversion has the expected sign, but it is not statistically
signiﬁcant.
Of course, we cannot conclude from these regressions that trust is more economically im-
portant in explaining stock market participation than risk or ambiguity aversion. In fact, it is
likely that trust is measured with less noise than both risk and ambiguity aversion and thus its
coeﬃcient estimates suﬀer less of the standard attenuation bias. What we can say, however, is
that if we want to predict the level of stock market participation, using measures of trust seems
more eﬀective than using measures of risk and ambiguity aversion.
An alternative interpretation of our ﬁnding is that trust, rather than reﬂecting an individual
fear of being cheated, captures investor’s optimism. Optimistic investors may be induced to
participate by their inﬂated expectations of returns. This possibility is strengthened by the
results of Puri and Robinson (2005), who ﬁnd that people who overestimates their life expectancy
(and thus are optimistic) invest more in stock.
We address this concern in two ways. First, in column (3) we insert a dummy variable equal
8It is not surprising that risk aversion has limited power in explaining stock market participation in our
regressions. In a standard model without participation costs, risk aversion should have no eﬀect. When one takes
into account costs of participation, risk aversion should have a negative eﬀect on participation. However, given
the costs are small (Vissing-Jørgensen, 2003), the eﬀect is likely to be trivial.
21to one for all those individuals who answer that they normally expect more good things to
happen to them than bad things (a measure of optimism). Consistent with Puri and Robinson
(2005), this variable has a positive eﬀect on stock market participation, albeit this eﬀect is
not statistically signiﬁcant. More importantly from our point of view, controlling for optimism
leaves the eﬀect of trust nearly unchanged.
Second, in column (4) we control for the household’s head expectations about the stock
market for the following year. Unfortunately, this question was asked to only 495 individuals and
when we merge them with our sample we are left with only 255 observations. Not surprisingly,
the eﬀect of trust loses precision. It is interesting to note, however, that it has the same
magnitude (in fact, slightly bigger) than before, suggesting our results on trust are not driven
by diﬀerent expectations about the future performance of the stock market.
Finally, in the last column we show that the eﬀect of trust does not fade away with wealth.
When we restrict the sample to those with above median ﬁnancial assets, the eﬀect of trust is
of the same order of magnitude and actually somewhat larger than in the overall sample. This
implies that trust has a chance to explain why even the rich may choose to keep themselves out
of the stock market, even if they can aﬀord to pay the ﬁxed participation cost.
Though it is reasonable to expect the eﬀect of trust to be particularly important for direct
participation in the stock market, it is neither limited to direct participation nor just to equity
investment. An investor needs some trust even when he buys a stock indirectly, through a
mutual fund, a broker, or a bank. While the presence of an intermediary reduces the need
for information (and thus for trust), it also increases exposure to opportunistic behavior of the
intermediary.9
Hence, the eﬀect of trust should generalize to investments in all risky assets, which we deﬁne
as the sum of directly and indirectly owned stocks, corporate bonds, and put and call options.
Table 6 shows this to be the case. The pattern of the estimates is very similar to that in Table 5.
While risk and ambiguity aversion have little predictive power on participation in risky assets,
9In Italy, for instance, there is anecdotal evidence that banks tend to re-balance their portfolio by advising
customers to buy the securities they want to unload. After the Summer 2001 FIAT, the Italian car maker,
experienced distress. When FIAT’s distress was still unknown to the public, one of the authors was strongly
advised by his bank to buy FIAT bonds, on the grounds that FIAT was the largest and most solid Italian ﬁrm.
22trust has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect: people who trust others have a probability of investing
in risky assets that is 8.5 percentage points higher, or about 20 percent of the sample mean. All
the other results are the same.
3.2 The Eﬀect of Generalized Trust on the Portfolio Share Invested in Stocks
According to the model in Section 1, not only does trust increase the likelihood an individual
invests in stock, but it also increases the share of wealth invested in stocks, conditional on
investing in them. We test this prediction in Table 7. Panel A presents the Tobit estimates
when the dependent variable is the portfolio share invested in stock (computed as the value of
stocks held directly divided by the value of ﬁnancial assets. We control for the same variables
as in the probit estimates reported in Table 6.
As in the participation estimates, the eﬀect of risk is poorly measured, while trust has
always a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect. Individuals who trust have a share in
stocks 3.4 percentage points higher, or about 15.5% of the sample mean. Ambiguity aversion
has a negative eﬀect on the share in stocks, while optimism has a positive eﬀect, but neither
coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcantly. Adding these controls leaves the eﬀect of trust unchanged.
Estimated eﬀects and conclusions are similar if instead of the share directly invested in stocks
we look at the share invested in all risky assets (Panel B).
In summary, the evidence thus far suggests that our measures of risk and ambiguity aversion
have little predictive power, while generalized trust has considerable explanatory power both
on direct and overall stockholding as well as on the fraction of the portfolio invested in stocks
and risky assets.
3.3 Education, Market Knowledge and the Eﬀect of Trust
If trust reﬂects individuals’ priors, then more educated individuals should be less aﬀected by
these priors, because they possess more reliable information. This is consistent with GSZ
(2004b), who ﬁnd that the trusting decision of more educated individuals is less aﬀected by
cultural stereotypes. Hence, a direct implication of the trust-based model is that the eﬀect of
trust on the stockholding decision should decrease with an investor’s level of education and with
23his knowledge of the market.
Table 8 tests this implication by splitting the sample according to educational attainments
(people with less than a secondary school degree and people with more). The results show a
clear pattern: the eﬀect of trust is stronger for people with less education. In fact, the coeﬃcient
for more highly educated individuals is never statistically diﬀerent from zero. For instance, trust
raises direct stockholding by 6 percentage points in the low education group and only by 1.4
percentage points in the high education sample. Similarly, the impact on the share invested in
stocks or in risky ﬁnancial assets is twice as large among the less educated.
4 Is Trust a Proxy for Risk Tolerance?
Given the noisiness of our measure of risk aversion, an obvious criticism to our results is that
trust may be just a proxy for (poorly measured) attitude to risk. All the eﬀects of trust
we have seen so far are consistent with this interpretation: if trust was just a proxy for risk
tolerance we would expect higher trust (risk tolerance) to be associated with a higher portfolio
share invested in stocks and, in the presence of some ﬁxed participation costs, with a higher
probability of participating in the stock market.
To address this concern we exploit the diﬀerential implications of trust and risk tolerance
on the number of stocks. As shown in Section 1, while the number of stocks unambiguously
decreases with the investor’s risk tolerance, it may increase with his degree of trust. Thus, if
we ﬁnd that trust has a positive eﬀect on the number of stocks, we can reject it is just a proxy
for (poorly measured) risk aversion.10
Table 9, Panel A, shows the results of an ordered probit estimate. The dependent variable
is the number of stocks in a household’s portfolio. The ﬁrst four columns report ordered probit
regressions for the whole sample.
Besides the male dummy and age, the only two variables that have predictive power on the
number of stocks are the level of wealth and generalized trust: individuals who trust invest on
10Since the optimal number of stocks does not necessarily have to increase with trust (see section 1) this test
can only reject that trust is a proxy for risk tolerance if the empirical relationship between number of stock and
trust is positive.
24average in 0.6 more stocks than those who do not trust. This is a non-negligible eﬀect, given
that the median number of stocks among stockholders is 3. In order to obtain a similar eﬀect,
we should move a household’s wealth from its median value to about the 80th percentile. All
the other controls - including measured risk aversion, ambiguity aversion and optimism have
the expected signs, but lack statistical signiﬁcance. To take into account the possibility that
one can achieve diversiﬁcation by investing in a mutual fund instead of buying single stocks, in
column 4 we include a dummy for whether the investor owns a stock mutual fund and results
are unchanged.
The last column restricts the sample to the equity holders (162 observations). Even in this
very limited sample trust has a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect, which is very similar
in magnitude to the one estimated in the whole sample. The only puzzling aspect is that our
measure of risk aversion has a negative impact on the number of stocks held.
An alternative way to separate trust from risk aversion is to look at insurance data. On
the one hand, more risk tolerant individuals should buy less insurance, at least as long as
insurance contracts are not actuarially fair (as generally they are not). On the other hand,
more trusting individuals should buy more insurance because insurance is just another ﬁnancial
contract with delayed and uncertain repayment, where trust can play a role. An individual who
is less conﬁdent the insurance promise will not be kept - i.e. has less trust - will be less likely
to insure himself.
Panel B uses data on holdings of private health insurance to distinguish between these
alternative predictions. Inconsistent with trust being a proxy for risk tolerance, trust has a
positive eﬀect on the decision to buy private health insurance (ﬁrst three columns), as well as on
the amount purchased (last two columns), albeit these eﬀects are very imprecisely estimated.11
In sum, there is no evidence that trust is a proxy for risk tolerance, while all the evidence is
consistent with mistrust creating a wedge between the demand the supply of ﬁnancial contracts.
11These results also suggest that trust is not a proxy for loss aversion. Loss aversion should make people to
buy more insurance, while the the regression evidence, albeit weak, is consistent with the trust interpretation.
255 Is Generalized or Personalized Trust that Matters?
The degree of trust a person has towards another or towards a company depends both on his
general trusting attitude and on the perceived trustworthiness of the counterparty. The nature
of the Dutch sample allowed us to capture only the ﬁrst eﬀect, we now move to our second
dataset (the Italian Bank customers survey), where we are able to capture the second one.
5.0.1 Bank customers’ data
This survey contains detailed information on portfolio composition and demographic character-
istics for a sample of 1,834 customers. It also asks participants to report how much they trust
the bank by asking:
“How much do you trust your bank oﬃcial or broker as ﬁnancial advisor for your
investment decisions?”
We create a dummy equal to one when a customer answers that he trusts the bank a lot
and a second dummy equal to one if he instead says he trusts the bank enough. The oﬀset
are the customers who trust the bank little or very little. Since the people interviewed are
already customers of the bank, their average level of trust is high: 30 percent report they trust
their banker a lot, while 45 percent report they trust it “enough”. We use these dummies as
a measure of personalized trust, i.e. of trust towards a well identiﬁed entity, in contrast to the
measure of generalized trust
This bank survey also tried to elicit attitudes towards risk by asking individuals to report
whether they view risk predominantly as a) an uncertain event from which one can proﬁt; b)
an uncertain event one should protect from. Hence, we will be able to control for this indicator
of risk preferences. Summary statistics for this sample are shown in Table 4F
5.1 Results
Table 10 reports the estimates of both the participation and the portfolio share decisions. As the
ﬁrst column shows, those who perceive risk as something to avoid rather than an opportunity -
the risk averse - are less likely to be stockholders. Diﬀerently from what we found in the DNB
26data, this measure of risk aversion has predictive power, perhaps because eliciting attitudes
towards risk this way is less subject to measurement errors. The eﬀect is also economically
important: being risk averse reduces the likelihood of investing in risky ﬁnancial assets by 5
percentage points (7.8% of the sample mean).
More importantly for our purposes, trust in the bank oﬃcer has also a positive and statis-
tically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the choice to invest in equity and the impact is sizeable. Compared
to those who do not trust, investors who trust a lot their bank are 16 percentage points more
likely to invest in stocks (25% of the sample mean).
The second column reports Tobit estimates for the share of ﬁnancial wealth in stocks, while
the third column reports estimates for the conditional share. In both cases trust has a positive
eﬀect on the investment in stocks, albeit in the conditional share equation this eﬀect is poorly
estimated.
Overall, these results conﬁrm those obtained by using a measure of generalized trust. That
lack of trust towards your own bank aﬀects ﬁnancial investment in risky assets testiﬁes the
pervasiveness of the eﬀects of trust on portfolio allocation. That the eﬀect is present even when
we have a better measure of risk further strengthens the conviction that trust is not a proxy for
risk tolerance.
6 The Eﬀect of Trust on Stock Market Development
Thus far, we have only analyzed the eﬀect of diﬀerences in trust across individuals. But what
are the aggregate implications of a low average level of trust in a country? When the average
level of trust is low, for any given level of returns, investors are more reluctant to invest. Hence,
to attract them, price-earnings ratios should fall. If they do, entrepreneurs will be less interested
in ﬂoating their companies or even in selling pieces of them to private investors (see Giannetti
and Koskinen, 2005).
We will test this implication both within a country and across countries.
276.1 Firms data
For our within-country test we rely on a sample of Italian ﬁrms and we exploit the variation in
the level of trust and social capital, which is very pronounced within Italy (Putnam, 1993).
The dataset used for this test draws from the 1999 Italian Survey of Manufacturing Firms
(SMF), which is run every three years by Mediocredito Centrale (an Italian investment bank)
on a sample of over 4,000 small and medium-sized manufacturing ﬁrms. The main purpose of
the survey is to collect information on several aspects of a ﬁrm’s activities with a focus on tech-
nological innovation and investment in research and development. It also contains information
on the ﬁrm ownership structures and their location.
6.2 Within country results
As a proxy for the local level of trust, we use a measure of electoral participation that Put-
nam argues is very closely associated with trust(GSZ, 2004a). As a measure of entrepreneurs’
propensity to sell a stake in their company, we use a dummy variable equal to 1 if the ﬁrm has
a single shareholder owning all the ﬁrm’s equity and zero otherwise.
Table 11 presents the results of this probit regression, where we control for other possible
determinants of a ﬁrm ownership structure (the north-south divide, the level of GDP per capita,
and a proxy for judicial ineﬃciency in the province where the ﬁrm is located).
Even controlling for all these environmental variables, the indicator of the level of local trust
has always a negative and highly statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the probability that a ﬁrm
is entirely owned by a single shareholder. This is consistent with the prediction that in places
where trust is scarce, corporations are reluctant to broaden their shareholder base.
6.3 International data
To test this prediction across countries we assemble information from three sources. We get
stock market participation (fraction of individuals who directly own stocks) from Giannetti and
Koskinen (2005).12 These data show remarkable variation: the fraction of direct stockholders
12Since individuals can also participate through mutual funds, pension funds, and managed investment accounts,
these ﬁgures represent a lower bound. But a very relevant one, since trust should be most important for direct
28is only 1.2 percent in Turkey (the lowest value in the sample) and 40 percent in Australia (the
highest value). The fraction of stock market capitalization that is closely held is obtained from
La Porta et al. (1998). From the same source we obtain an index of legal enforcement, and the
country legal origin. Finally, average trust in each country is obtained from the World Values
Survey. It is computed as fraction of individuals in each country who reply that most people
can be trusted.
6.4 Cross-country results
Table 12 reports the results. In the ﬁrst three columns the dependent variable is the percentage
of the stock market capitalization that is closely held. As expected, trust has a negative eﬀect
on this variable and the eﬀect is both statistically and economically signiﬁcant. If Turkey had
the same level of trust as Belgium (the median country) the fraction of the stock market closely
held would be 11 percentage points lower.
When we control (column 2) for legal enforcement as done by Giannetti and Koskinen
(2005), the coeﬃcient of trust becomes even larger in absolute value. Further controlling for
Common Law, leaves the eﬀect of trust positive and signiﬁcant and its coeﬃcient unchanged
suggesting that trust plays an independent and additive role with respect to the quality of
formal institutions in explaining worldwide diﬀerences in ownership concentration. The results
(not reported) are substantially the same when, as a measure of trust, we use the fraction of
people who do not have at all conﬁdence in major corporations.
If entrepreneurs are reluctant to ﬂoat their companies and investors are reluctant to invest,
countries with low levels of trust should also exhibit low levels of stock market participation. To
test this implication we look at the proportion of population that invests in the stock market.
As Figure 2 shows, this proportion varies widely across countries. Stockholders are as low as 2
percent in Turkey and as high as 40 percent in Australia.
While entry costs might diﬀer across countries, it is hard to believe that they are much lower
in Australia and New Zealand (the countries with the highest participation) than in Switzerland
(with a participation rate of 18%) or Belgium (where only 6 percent buy equity).
investment.
29It would also be hard to explain this variation just with diﬀerences in risk or ambiguity
aversion. In so far as these preference parameters reﬂect innate traits, their distribution should
be similar across diﬀerent populations.
By contrast, since generalized trust is aﬀected by culture and history, it can potentially diﬀer
considerably across communities, as indeed it does. In our sample, the share of individuals that
trust varies between a low of 3 percent in Brazil and a high of 67 percent in Denmark.
The second three columns of Table 13 formally test this relation by regressing the share
of stockholders in each country on the World Values Survey measure of trust. As predicted,
trust has a positive eﬀect on stock ownership and this eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant. This
result is unchanged if we control for the quality of legal enforcement (column 5) and for the
fact a country has a common law system (6). In all these cases the eﬀect is very economically
signiﬁcant. If Turkey had the same level of trust as Ireland (the median country) the share of
stockholders would increase to 8 percentage points, more than a six-fold increase in the level of
participation in that country.13
7 Conclusions
After the recent corporate scandals, a lot of politicians and business commentators argued that
investors were deserting the stock market because they had lost their trust in Corporate America.
In spite of the popularity of this interpretation, the ﬁnance literature has so far ignored the role
of trust in explaining stock market participation and portfolio choices.
This paper tries to ﬁll this gap. Not only do we show that, in theory, lack of trust can
explain why individuals do not participate in the stock market even in the absence of any other
friction. But we also show that, in practice, diﬀerences in trust across individuals and countries
help explain why some invest in stocks, while others do not. Our simulations also suggest that
this problem can be suﬃciently severe to explain the percentage of wealthy people who do not
invest in the stock market in the Unite States and the wide variation in this percentage across
countries.
13The results (not reported) are substantially the same when, as a measure of trust, we use the fraction of
people who do not have at all conﬁdence in major corporations.
30Another outstanding puzzle regarding stock market participation is why some demographics,
such as race, have so much impact on the decision to invest in stock, even after controlling
for wealth and education (e.g., Chiteji and Staﬀord (2000)). That the race eﬀect disappears
when Chiteji and Staﬀord (2000) control for whether parents owned stock points to a cultural
explanation of the phenomenon. Since trust is very much linked to family background (Banﬁeld
(1958) GSZ (2004a)), our trust-based model has the potential to address even this puzzle.
If it is a policy goal to promote wider stock ownership, then this paper has two implications.
First, a better education about the stock market can reduce the negative eﬀect of lack of
trust. Second, it becomes crucial to understand the determinants of investors’ (possibly biased)
perception of the trustworthiness of the stock market. This is the next item in our research
agenda.
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Proof of Proposition 3
First notice that EU(α∗
0e r(W−f)+(1−α∗
0)rf(W−f)) = U(α∗
0 b r0(W−f)+(1−α∗
0)rf(W−f)) >
EU(α∗
pe r(W − f) + (1 − α∗
p)rf(W − f)) = U(α∗
p b rp(W − f) + (1 − α∗
p) rf(W − f), since
α∗
0 maximizes the ﬁrst expression above and U is increasing in ﬁnal wealth. It follows that
α∗
0 b r0 > α∗
p b rp. We can now show that if W = W0 and p > 0 the investor will not participate, i.e.
(1 − p)EU(α∗
p b rp(W0 − f) + (1 − α∗
p)rf(W0 − f)) + pU((1 − α∗
p)rf(W0 − f)) < U(rfW0). Since
(1−α∗
p)rf(W0−f) < rfW0, it is enough to show that α∗
p b rp(W0−f)+(1−α∗
p)rf(W0−f) < rfW0.
Substituting the value of W0, the above inequality always holds since α∗
0 b r0 > α∗
p b rp.Thus, with
partial trust, the wealth threshold required to enter the stock market is larger than when there
is full trust.
Existence of a Solution for the Optimal Number of Stocks
The ﬁrst order condition for the problem
Maxn −
h
p + (1 − p)e−θ(W/n)r+ 1
2θ2(W/n)2σ2 in
− cn
is
FOC : −Zn
h
logZ +
Z−p
Z (θW
n r − θ2(W
n )2σ2)
i
= c
where Z =
h
p + (1 − p)e−θ(W/n)r+ 1
2θ2(W/n)2σ2 i
.
To show that the ﬁrst-order condition has at least one solution, we take limits of the LHS
of the ﬁrst order condition for n → +∞ and n → 0.
• Limit of LHS when n → +∞
In this case, limn→+∞Z = 1, limn→+∞Zn = e−(1−p)θrw and LHS → 0.
To see why limn→+∞Zn = e−(1−p)θrw , we write the following approximations:
1) log(Z) ≈ log(1 + Z − 1) ≈ Z − 1
2) Z − 1 = (1 − p)(e−θ(W/n)r+ 1
2θ2(W/n)2σ2
− 1)
≈ (1 − p)
￿
−θ(W/n)r + 1
2θ2(W/n)2σ2￿
3)Zn = enlog(Z) ≈ (1 − p)(−θ(W)r)
32• Limit of LHS when n → 0
1) Now limn→0Z = +∞ and limn→0Zn = +∞
2)
Z−p
Z =
(1−p)e
−θ(W/n)r+ 1
2 θ2(W/n)2σ2
p+(1−p)e
−θ(W/n)r+ 1
2θ2(W/n)2σ2
=
1−p
1−p+pe
θ(W/n)r− 1
2θ2(W/n)2σ2
So that limn→0
Z−p
Z = 1
3) Let K = θ(W/n)r − 1
2θ2 (W/n)
2 σ2
We can write the following approximations:
Z − p
Z
=
(1 − p)e−K
(1 − p)e−K + p
=
1
1 +
p
1−peK
≈ 1 −
p
1 − p
eK
log(Z) = log(
p
1 − p
eK + 1) + log(1 − p)e−K
= log(
p
1 − p
eK + 1) + log(1 − p) − K
So that:
logZ +
Z − p
Z
(θ(W/n)r − θ2 (W/n)
2 σ2)
≈ log(
p
1 − p
eK + 1) + log(1 − p) − K +
￿
1 −
p
1 − p
eK
￿
(θ(W/n)r − θ2 (W/n)
2 σ2)
∼
n→0
−
1
2
θ2 (W/n)
2 σ2
This means that
￿
logZ +
Z−p
Z (θ(W/n)r − θ2 (W/n)
2 σ
￿
→ −∞ as n → 0 and that LHS
goes to +∞.
Since c > 0, according to the intermediate value theorem, the ﬁrst-order conditions have a
solution.
33B Appendix B: The DNB survey and the bank customers sur-
vey
B.1 The DNB Survey
We rely on the the 2003 wave of the DNB Household Survey. The DNB survey collects infor-
mation on a sample of about 1,943 Dutch households (about 4,000 individuals). The survey,
sponsored by the Dutch National Bank, is administered and run by Center at Tilburg Univer-
sity. The purpose of the survey is to collect household level data to study the economic and
psychological determinants of households savings behavior. Interviews are done via computer
through the internet. If a household has no computer or access to the net, Center provides a
set-top box and if necessary a television set that can be used to ﬁll in questionnaires. This
feature allows Center to interview the panel occasionally after the main survey has been con-
ducted and collect additional data on some topic of interest. On the main survey, participants
are submitted seven questionnaires each covering a diﬀerent feature of the household: general
information on household demographics; home and market work; housing and mortgages; health
conditions and income; ﬁnancial assets and liabilities; economic and psychological attitudes and
work and home. All individuals in the households of age above 16 are interviewed but the
general information is collected for all household members.
B.2 The bank customers survey
The bank customer survey (BCS) draws on a sample of one of the largest Italian banking groups,
with over 4 million accounts. The survey was conducted in the Fall of 2003 and elicits detailed
ﬁnancial and demographic information on a sample of 1,834 individuals with a checking account
in one of the banks that are part of the group. The sample is representative of eligible population
of customers, excluding customers aged less than 20 and more than eighty, and those who hold
accounts of less than 1,000 euro or more than 2.5 million euro. Account holders are stratiﬁed
according to three criteria: geographical area, city size, and ﬁnancial wealth, and it explicitly
over-samples rich individuals.
The goal of the survey is to understand customers’ behavior and expectations.
34The questionnaire was constructed with the help of ﬁeld experts and academic researchers.
It has 8 sections, dealing with household demographic structure and on occupation, propensity
to save, to invest and to risk, individuals and household ﬁnancial wealth and liabilities, real
estate and on entrepreneurial activities, income and expectations and needs for insurance and
pension products.
C Appendix C: Measuring risk and ambiguity aversion
C.1 The coeﬃcient of risk aversion
Since survey participants are reporting the price that makes them indiﬀerent between partici-
pating in the lottery and paying the reported price q and not participating, it must be that
−eθW =
1
2
(−eθ(W+X−q)) +
1
2
(−eθ(W−q))
where X is the lottery prize (5,000 euros in the survey). Using this indiﬀerence condition we
compute for each individual in the sample his/her absolute risk aversion parameter θ. A measure
of relative risk aversion can be obtained multiplying θ by the individual endowment (income or
wealth or the sum of the two).14
C.2 The coeﬃcient of ambiguity aversion
To get a measure of ambiguity aversion from the answers to our questions we rely on the
utility model recently developed by Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini (2005). Consider an
individual who must make a decision prior to the realization of an unknown state of nature s.
There is a ﬁnite set S of possible states and a typical choice will be a vector (x1,...,xS) among
a choice set X. The environment is ambiguous in the sense that the decision maker cannot
precisely evaluate his subjective probability distribution for the states of nature but he however
has a set of subjective probability distributions Π.
14The assumption about the shape of the utility function to obtain the risk aversion parameter is not important.
Assuming that individuals have CRRA preferences and backing the relative risk aversion parameter under this
assumption gives essentially the same estimates of absolute risk aversion as using CARA preferences.
35In this framework ambiguity-averse preferences for two-state lotteries can be written as
v(x) = Eπu(x) if there is no ambiguity
v(x) = min
π∈{πA,πB}
￿
Eπu(x) + ω(π log
π
π∗ + (1 − π)log(
1 − π
1 − π∗))
￿
where π∗ is a reference probability measure for the distribution (π,1 − π).The term (π log π
π∗ +
(1 − π)log( 1−π
1−π∗)) is a measure of entropy and the extent of aversion to ambiguity is measured
by the parameter ω. Letting qA denote the willingness to pay for the ambiguous lottery and X
the prize of the lottery (5,000 euro), the index of ambiguity aversion can be computed as:
ω =
u(W) − πAu(W − qA) − (1 − πA)u(W + X − qA)
(πA log πA
π∗ + (1 − πA)log(1−πA
1−π∗ ))
where W is the person’s wealth and the risk aversion of the utility function u(W) is obtained
from the answers to the purely risky lottery. In our case the reference measure (π∗,1− π∗) can
be taken to be (1/2,1/2).
We can further develop this formula to separate the eﬀect of pure risk-aversion on the
ambiguity index a from the eﬀect of ambiguity and write it as
ω =
u(W) − 1/2u(W − P) − 1/2u(W + X − P)
(πA log πA
π∗ + (1 − πA)log(1−πA
1−π∗ ))
+
1/2u(W − P) + 1/2u(W + X − P) − πAu(W − P) − (1 − πA)u(W + X − P)
(πA log πA
π∗ + (1 − πA)log(1−πA
1−π∗ ))
The ﬁrst term reﬂects the pure eﬀect of risk-aversion and is equal to zero if the participant
is risk neutral; the second term reﬂects the eﬀect of ambiguity, that is the eﬀect of distorting
the perceived probability from (1/2,1/2) to (πB,1 − πB). Here the distortion of the perceived
probability distribution is made in favor of the “worst case model” (πA,1 − πA). Another way
to reﬁne the index is to consider the second term only as the index of ambiguity aversion.
Note that in this model there will be a non zero ambiguity aversion index even if the will-
ingness to pay are the same for both the purely risky lottery and the ambiguous lottery. This is
due to the fact that ambiguity (the sole fact of not knowing the probabilities) has this eﬀect of
distorting the perceived probabilities for the decision maker which should be taken into account.
36In practice, for CARA utility, we have that:
u(x) = −
1
θ
e−θx
ω = −
1
θ
e−θW 1 − πAeθqA − (1 − πA)e−θ(X−qA)
(πA log πA
π∗ + (1 − πA)log(1−πA
1−π∗ ))
= u(W)
1 − πAeθqA − (1 − πA)e−θ(X−qA)
(πA log πA
π∗ + (1 − πA)log(1−πA
1−π∗ ))
and for CRRA utility, we have that:
u(x) =
x1−γ
1 − γ
ω =
W1−γ
1 − γ
1 − πA(1 −
qA
W )1−γ − (1 − πA)(1 +
X−qA
W )1−γ
(πA log πA
π∗ + (1 − πA)log(1−πA
1−π∗ ))
= u(W)
1 − πA(1 −
qA
W )1−γ − (1 − πA)(1 +
X−qA
W )1−γ
(πA log πA
π∗ + (1 − πA)log(1−πA
1−π∗ ))
As already noticed by Maenhout (2000,2002), the Hansen-Sargent static multiplier prefer-
ences, of which the Maccheroni et al. (2005) are a generalization, are not homogeneous in wealth
even if the utility function u is homogeneous in wealth, this is the reason why the ambiguity
aversion index ω is proportional to u(W) when u is homogeneous in wealth. In the numerical
calculations, we report only ω
u(W), the main reason is that u(W) is extremely small (in the order
of 10−10).
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This figure reports the optimal number of stock an investor should hold for different levels of risk aversion and different levels of trust. Trust is the 
percentage probability of being cheated. Theta is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion of an exponential utility function.   
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Table I  StocK Market Participation Rate 
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  43 Table 1 
Proportion of Households Investing in Risky Assets, by Asset Quartiles  
The first panel shows the proportion of households in each quartile of gross financial wealth who owns stock directly. 
The second panel shows the same proportion when we include also indirect ownership, via mutual funds or pension 
funds. Data for European countries are computed from the 2004 wave of the Survey for Health, Age, and Retirement in 
Europe (Share), and refer to year 2003. Data for the U.S. are drawn from the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances. Data 
for the U.K. are drawn from the 1997-98 Financial Research Survey.   
 
Direct Stockholding 
  Quartile I  Quartile II  Quartile III  Quartile IV  Top 5 %  Average 
U.S. 1.4  6.9  20.6  47.9  70.1  19.2 
U.K. 0.0  4.4  28.3  53.6  67.9  21.6 
Netherlands 1.5  7.4  20.0  40.3  60.2 17.2   
Germany 0.6 4.1  16.1  36.1  50.5  14.0 
Italy 0.0  0.8  3.1  12.8  30.8  4.0 
Austria 0  1.7  2.8  15.6  25.7  5.0 
Sweden 12.9  30.7 46.9 72.8  80.6  40.8 
Spain 0  0.3  1.8  13.2  14.4  3.5 
France 0.7  9.9  14.6  33.3  44.2  14.4 
Denmark 6.3 25.9 36.4  55.6  68.4  31.0 
Greece 0  0.7  3.2  17.3 23.5  4.9 
Switzerland 2.8  12.2  30.3  54.2  63.2 24.9 
 
Direct and Indirect Stockholding 
  Quartile I  Quartile II  Quartile III  Quartile IV  Top 5 %  Average 
U.S. 4.4  38.3  66.0  86.7  93.7  48.9 
U.K. 4.9  11.9  37.8  71.1  83.9  31.5 
Netherlands 1.7  11.0  31.3  52.8  72.0 24.1 
Germany 6.6 17.6 22.1  29.3  41.6  22.9 
Italy 0.0  0.8  5.2  27.5  64.8  8.2 
Austria 0  1.9  8.1  25.5  33.8  8.8 
Sweden 25.8  63.4 82.7 92.9  95.8  66.2 
Spain 0  1.1  3.0  19.1  24.6  5.4 
France 1.1  17.6  29.9  57.6  67.3  26.2 
Denmark 6.6 30.8 44.8  65.7  75.4  37.0 
Greece 0  0.7  4.0  22.2 32.9  6.3 
Switzerland 2.8  20.0  38.2  63.7  65.8 31.4 
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Trust in Large Companies 
This table reports data from the World Values Survey on people’s trust toward large companies. The first 
column reports the proportion of people who do not have confidence at all in major corporations, while the 
second the proportion that does not have very much confidence. Column 3 is the sum of the previous two. For 
each country we report the value for the whole sample, for the people in the top 30% of the income 
distribution and for people in the top 10% of the income distribution.  To compute these values we pool the 
1981-1984, 1990-1993 and 1995-1997 waves of the WVS.   
 
 
How much confidence do you have in major companies?     
Country 
 
 
 
 
No confidence 
 
(1) 
 
Not very much 
confidence 
(2) 
 
Total fraction 
with limited 
confidence 
(1)+(2) 
      
USA      
Total sample  7.22  41.54  48.76 
Top 30%  6.46  41.78  48.24 
Top 10%  5.03  43.55  48.58 
      
France      
Total sample  12.51  30.66  53.17 
Top 30%  13.21  30.88  44.09 
Top 10%  4.62  21.54  26.16 
      
Germany      
Total sample  16.95  49.27  66.22 
Top 30%  15.47  48.82  64.29 
Top 10%  13.37  50.87  64.24 
      
Italy      
Total sample  18.54  31.38  49.92 
Top 30%  28.32  35.49  53.81 
Top 10%  28.89  38.67  67.56 
      
Netherland      
Total sample  12.03  47.29  59.32 
Top 30%  8.66  48.38  57.04 
Top 10%  3.45  40.23  43.68 
      
Sweeden      
Total sample  5.99  40.31  46.30 
Top 30%  3.34  33.89  37.23 
Top 10%  2.0  20.0  22.0 
 
  45 
 
Table 3 
Calibration 
Panel A shows the result of a calibration exercise of the optimal portfolio choice for different levels of trust (expressed 
as perceived probability p that an investor will be cheated). The first column reports these perceived probabilities, 
varying between 0 and the maximum value above which no participation takes place. Column 2 reports the wealth 
threshold beyond which people invests in the stock market expressed as a ratio of the level of wealth that will trigger 
investment in the absence of trust considerations. Column 3 reports the optimal portfolio share invested in the stock 
market, conditional on investing. The calculations assume the investor has exponential utility, wealth is set equal to 1, 
relative risk aversion is 5, the participation cost is 0.1 percent of wealth and the return on equity and the risk free rate 
are 1.12 and 1.05, respectively. Panel B reports the ration of the 75
th and 90
th percentile of financial assets to median 
values.             
 
 
A. Probability of being cheated and wealth participation threshold  
Probability 
of being cheated in the 
stock market 
Wealth participation 
thresholds /wealth 
threshold when trust is 
full (p=0) 
Optimal share invested 
in stocks if participation 
occurs 
0 1 0.350 
0.005 1.251 0.249 
0.01 1.662 0.197 
0.015 2.066 0.160 
0.02 2.713 0.131 
0.025 3.544 0.107 
0.03 5.195 0.087 
0.035 6.349 0.070 
0.04 7.503 0.054 
0.05 8.658 0.028 
0.06 9.812 0.005 
 
 
B. ratio of 75
th and 90
th percentile of financial assets to median value  
 USA  Italy  France  Netherlands 
      
75
th percentile/median  4.908 2.932 2.996 2.945 
      
90
h percentile/median  14.018 6.819 7.339 7.426 
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Summary statistics  
The table shows summary statistics of the variables used. Panels A-D use data from the Dutch National Bank survey. 
Financial wealth, income and health insurance premium are in thousand euro. Trust is a dummy equal to one if a person 
answers ``most people can be trusted” to the question: ``Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be 
trusted or that you have to be very careful in dealing with people}?"The price for the lotteries is obtained asking people 
how much were they are willing to pay to participate in a lottery. In the unambiguous lottery the interviewed is given 
the exact number of balls in the urn. In the ambiguous one this number is uncertain, but the interviewed if given the 
probability distribution. The coefficient of risk aversion is obtained fitting a CARA utility. `` Optimism is an index of 
agreement 9from 1 to 5) to the statement ``I expect more good things to happen to me than bad things.” “Expect stock 
market to go up” is a dummy equal to one if the interviewed answers ``increase” to the question “do you expect market 
stock prices to increase, remain constant or decrease in the next two years?” Panel E is from a survey of bank customers 
of a large Italian commercial bank.  In this sample high trust is a dummy equal to 1 when a bank customer responds "a 
lot" or "enough" to the question: ``How much do you trust your bank official or broker as financial advisor for your 
investment decisions?”. Medium trust is a dummy variable equal to one if s/he answers "so and so" or "not much" (the 
left out category is "not at all"). Panel F is from an international dataset combining data from Giannetti and Koskinen 
(2005), from La Porta et al. (1998) and from the World Value Survey (data on trust).  
 
  
  A. Stock holdings, financial assets and income: DNB (N. 1,444) 
 Mean  Median  SD  Min  Max 
Direct stockholders  0.135  0.0  0.342  0  1 
Risky assets holders  0.422  0.0  0.449  0  1 
Portfolio share in stocks   0.033  0 0.119 0  1 
Portfolio share in stocks among 
stockholders 
0.203 0.118 0.229  0.0001  0.926 
Portfolio share in risky assets  0.124  0  0.230  0  1 
Portfolio share in risky assets 
among holders of risky assets 
0.295 0.195 0.274 0.001  1 
Number  of  stocks  0.532 0 2.873 0  97 
Number of stocks among 
stockholders 
3.90 3  6.952  1  97 
Holders of health insurance  0.269  0  0.444  0  1 
Health insurance premium 
(‘000 of euros) 
0.178 0 1.148 0  44.411 
Household financial wealth 
(‘000 of euros) 
031.230   10.140  66.804  0  838.041 
Gross household income 
(‘000 of euros) 
28.128 22.362 68.930  0  2,197.032 
Number  of  observations       
 
 
 
 
  B. Trust, risk aversion, ambiguity aversion and optimism: DNB (N. 1,444) 
 Mean  Median  SD  Min  Max 
Trust WVS  0.332  0.0  0.471  0  1 
Absolute risk aversion  0.107  0.028  0.186  0  0.693 
Ambiguity aversion   4.155  7.1077  4.275  -2.389  41.692 
Price to participate in risky 
lottery  (‘000 of euros) 
0.123 0.001 0.421  0  5 
Price to partic. in ambiguous 
lottery (‘000 of euros) 
0.090 0.001 0.341  0  3 
Individual  optimism  3.127 4 1.532 0  5 
Expect stock market to go up  0.596  1  0.458  0  1 
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C. Correlation matrix between trust, risk aversion, ambiguity aversion and optimism: DNB (N. 1,444) 
  Trust WVS   Absolute risk 
aversion 
Ambiguity 
aversion 
Optimism 
Trust WVS   1       
Absolute risk aversion  0.017  1     
Ambiguity aversion  0.014  0.072  1   
Optimism  0.310 0.172 0.013  1 
 
 .   
          D. Trust and wealth  
  Financial Wealth   
 
  Quartile I  Quartile II  Quartile III  Quartile IV  Top 5 %  Average 
            
Trust WVS   0.342  0.373  0.409  0.396  0.365  0.382 
 
 
          E. Household head and household demographics: DNB  
 Mean  Median  SD  Min  Max 
 Male  0.466  0.0  0.499  0  1 
Age 30.184  34  27.011  0  90 
High  education  0.178 0 0.382 0  1 
Medium education   0.292  0    0.455  0  1 
Employee  0.369  0    0.483   0  1 
N. of household members  2.442  2  1.281  1  8 
N. of children in the household  0.711  0  1.070  0  6 
       
 
 
 
           F. Summary statistics for the Bank Customer Dataset  ((N = 1,834) 
 Mean  Median  SD  Min  Max 
Share holding risky assets  0.638  1  0.481  0  1 
Portfolio share of risky assets  0.223  0.110  0.269  0  1 
High trust in bank official  0.665  1  0.472  0  1 
Medium trust in bank official  0.135  0  0.342  0  1 
Averse  to  risk  0.709 1 0.454 0  1 
Financial assets 
 (‘000, euros) 
109.185 25 270.810  0  3,760 
  Male  0.711 1 0.453 0  1 
Age 54.698  56  14.366  21  85 
Years of education  11.974  13  4.412  0  21 
 
 
G. Summary statistics for the International Data ((N= 33) 
 Mean  Median  SD  Min  Max 
% of stock market cap. closely 
held  44.03 42.43 18.38  7.94 77.48 
% population participating in 
the stock market  0.16 0.15 0.10 0.01 0.40 
Average  trust  0.34 0.36 0.17 0.03 0.67 
Legal  enforcement  0.54 0.50 0.24 0.17 1.00 
Common  law  0.32 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 
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Table 5 
The effect of trust on direct stock market participation 
The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the household directly owns shares in a company (be it 
listed or not) except in his own company. The table reports the probit estimates, calculated as the effect 
on the LHS of a marginal change in the RHS variable computed at the average value of the RHS 
variables.  All household characteristics, which are defined in Table 1, are assumed to be those of the 
household head. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *** indicate the coefficient is different 
from zero at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10 % level. 
  
Whole sample 
Above 
median 
wealth 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Trust 0.065***  0.059***  0.057***  0.064  0.072** 
  (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.051) (0.036) 
Risk  aversion  0.055 0.061 0.061 0.012 0.113 
  (0.052) (0.047) (0.047) (0.122) (0.085) 
Ambiguity      -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 
aversion    (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
Optimism     0.005  0.047*  0.023 
     (0.010)  (0.025)  (0.019) 
Stock market         -0.020   
expected to go up        (0.043)   
Financial wealth  0.001***  0.001***  0.001***  0.001**  0.001*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Income 0.994  0.837  0.824  -7.001  3.831 
 (1.325)  (1.190)  (1.189)  (20.720)  (3.662) 
Male  0.039 0.036 0.036 0.025 0.047 
  (0.027) (0.024) (0.024) (0.069) (0.045) 
Age  -0.005**  -0.004* -0.005* -0.010*  -0.006 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) 
Age square  0.000**  0.000**  0.000**  0.000*  0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Household size  -0.015  -0.014  -0.014  0.041  -0.075* 
  (0.026) (0.023) (0.023) (0.060) (0.045) 
Number of   0.040  0.037  0.037  0.009  0.121** 
children (0.030)  (0.028)  (0.028) (0.065) (0.054) 
College education  0.072**  0.066**  0.063*  0.357***  0.072 
  (0.036) (0.033) (0.033) (0.133) (0.053) 
High school   0.041  0.038  0.036  0.169*  0.055 
education (0.029)  (0.027) (0.027) (0.091) (0.047) 
Employee -0.002  -0.000  -0.002  -0.139**  -0.058 
  (0.030) (0.027) (0.027) (0.067) (0.053) 
Observations 1156  1156  1156  255 618 
 
 
  49Table 6 
The effect of trust on participation in risky assets 
The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the household directly owns any risky asset (shares, 
mutual funds, corporate bonds, put and call options) except equity in his own company. The table 
reports the probit estimates, calculated as the effect on the LHS of a marginal change in the RHS 
variable computed at the average value of the RHS variables.  All household characteristics, which are 
defined in Table 1, are assumed to be those of the household head. Standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis. *** indicate the coefficient is different from zero at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * 
at the 10 % level. 
 
  
Whole sample 
Above 
median 
wealth 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Trust  0.085** 0.084** 0.082**  0.053  0.084* 
  (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.079) (0.044) 
Risk  aversion -0.100 -0.107 -0.106 -0.039 0.019 
  (0.091) (0.092) (0.092) (0.197) (0.115) 
Ambiguity      0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
aversion    (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) 
Optimism    0.007  -0.009  0.042* 
     (0.019)  (0.040)  (0.023) 
Stock market         -0.028   
exp. to go up        (0.077)   
Financial  wealth  0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Income  -1.951 -1.979 -2.006  -53.158  -4.451 
  (3.271) (3.290) (3.295)  (33.834)  (5.356) 
Male  0.109** 0.109** 0.109**  0.153  0.096 
  (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.116) (0.062) 
Age  -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.009  -0.011* 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) 
Age  square  0.000* 0.000* 0.000*  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Household  size  0.165*** 0.165*** 0.164***  0.083  0.119** 
  (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.096) (0.056) 
Number of   -0.109**  -0.109**  -0.108**  0.023  -0.051 
Children  (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.108) (0.066) 
College    0.016 0.016 0.013 0.136 -0.029 
education (0.050)  (0.050) (0.051) (0.111) (0.061) 
High  school   0.020 0.019 0.017 0.083 0.011 
education (0.045)  (0.045) (0.045) (0.094) (0.057) 
Employee  0.183*** 0.183*** 0.181***  0.203*  0.109* 
  (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.107) (0.066) 
Observations 1,007 1,007 1,007  237  618 
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Table 7 
The effect of trust on the portfolio share in stocks and risky assets  
The table reports Tobit estimates for the portfolio share invested in stocks (Panel A) and in risky assets 
(Panel B), except equity in his own company. The share in stocks it the value of household holdings of listed 
and unlisted stocks divided by total household financial assets; the share in risky assets is the value in stocks, 
in stock mutual funds, corporate bonds and put and call divided by total family financial wealth. All 
characteristics are those of the household head.  Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *** indicate the 
coefficient is different from zero at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10 % level. 
 
A: Share of household in financial assets invested in stocks 
      
Trust  0.131*** 0.133*** 0.130***  0.145 
  (0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.119) 
Risk  aversion  0.064 0.085 0.085 -0.048 
  (0.116) (0.118) (0.118) (0.332) 
Ambiguity     -0.003  -0.003  0.003 
aversion    (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) 
Optimism     0.012  0.088 
     (0.026)  (0.068) 
Stock market         -0.039 
expected to go up        (0.119) 
Financial  wealth  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***  0.001 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Income  0.873 0.781 0.754  -19.128 
  (3.293) (3.274) (3.274)  (53.827) 
Male  0.129* 0.132* 0.132*  0.161 
  (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.211) 
Age  -0.011** -0.011** -0.012** -0.028** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.014) 
Age  square  0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Household size  -0.066  -0.067  -0.067  0.071 
  (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.166) 
Number of   0.139**  0.141**  0.141**  0.141 
children  (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.179) 
College    0.169** 0.171** 0.166**  0.724*** 
Education  (0.067) (0.067) (0.068) (0.232) 
High  school    0.087 0.089 0.086  0.400* 
education  (0.063) (0.063) (0.064) (0.217) 
Employee -0.012  -0.010  -0.014  -0.348** 
  (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.170) 
Observations  999 999 999 234 
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B. Share of household financial assets invested in risky financial assets 
     
Trust  0.096*** 0.096*** 0.095***  0.022 
  (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.071) 
Risk  aversion  -0.093 -0.095 -0.095 -0.068 
  (0.086) (0.087) (0.087) (0.181) 
Ambiguity      0.000 0.000 0.004 
aversion    (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) 
Optimism     0.004  -0.003 
     (0.018)  (0.035) 
Stock market         -0.030 
expected to go up        (0.070) 
Financial  wealth  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***  0.001* 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Income -2.152  -2.164  -2.180  -32.009 
  (3.295) (3.301) (3.304)  (30.996) 
Male  0.125*** 0.124*** 0.125***  0.231** 
  (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.117) 
Age -0.009**  -0.009**  -0.010**  -0.014* 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) 
Age  square  0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Household  size  0.066 0.066 0.065 -0.034 
  (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.095) 
Number of   -0.007  -0.007  -0.007  0.169 
Children  (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.104) 
College    0.028 0.028 0.027 0.159 
Education  (0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.101) 
High  school    0.017 0.017 0.015 0.009 
Education  (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.086) 
Employee  0.120** 0.120** 0.119**  0.096 
  (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.101) 
Observations  999 999 999 234 
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Trust and education 
In this table we re-estimate the regressions in Table 4 (first two columns), in Table 5 (second two columns), 
and in Table 6 (last four columns) splitting the sample by level of education. In the first two columns the left 
hand side variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the household holds equity directly; in the second two columns is 
a dummy equal to 1 if the household holds stocks directly or indirectly and/or invests in corporate bonds and 
put and call options. In the remaining columns the left hand side variable is the share oh household financial 
assets invested directly in equity (columns 5 and 6) and in risky assets (last two columns), respectively; the 
share in risky assets is the value in stocks, in stock mutual funds, corporate bonds and put and call options 
divided by total family financial wealth. In all cases, investment in stock does not include equity in his own 
company. As in Tables 4 and 5, the first four columns are probit estimates, calculated as the effect on the 
LHS of a marginal change in the RHS variable computed at the average value of the RHS variables. The last 
four columns are tobit estimates. High education includes all those with a high college degree or a university 
degree. Low education includes all those with less than high college education. Education is that of the head 
of the household. All characteristics are those of the household head.  Standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis. *** indicate the coefficient is different from zero at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 
10 % level. 
 
  Ownership of stock  Ownership of risky 
assets 
Share of stocks  Share of risky assets 
 Low  educ  High 
educ 
Low educ  High 
educ 
Low educ  High 
educ 
Low educ  High 
educ 
             
Trust  0.059** 0.014 0.095** 0.056  0.155***  0.071  0.119***  0.052 
  (0.025) (0.046) (0.045) (0.068)  (0.052)  (0.095)  (0.040)  (0.063) 
Risk   0.018  0.229*  -0.094  -0.201  -0.004  0.288  -0.102  -0.174 
aversion  (0.038) (0.118) (0.105) (0.195)  (0.126)  (0.250)  (0.097)  (0.186) 
Ambiguity   -0.003***  -0.001  0.000  0.001  -0.007  -0.002  0.000  0.001 
aversion  (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
Optimism  -0.000 0.032 -0.001 0.021  -0.003  0.066  -0.006  0.021 
  (0.008) (0.029) (0.022) (0.040)  (0.026)  (0.061)  (0.020)  (0.037) 
Financial    0.001***  0.002***  0.002***  0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Wealth  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Income -0.127  3.785  -3.118  -0.618 -0.278 2.700 -3.006 -1.194 
  (1.136) (3.355) (5.310) (5.426)  (3.653)  (7.012)  (4.860)  (5.336) 
Male 0.022  0.068  0.141**  0.021  0.089  0.216*  0.132**  0.069 
  (0.022) (0.050) (0.061) (0.080)  (0.080)  (0.122)  (0.061)  (0.076) 
Age  -0.002 -0.009 -0.005  -0.035*  -0.004 -0.025 -0.003  -0.049*** 
  (0.002) (0.011) (0.005) (0.018)  (0.006)  (0.023)  (0.005)  (0.016) 
Age square  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000**  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Household   -0.013  0.003  0.182***  0.114  -0.049  -0.094  0.121**  -0.087 
size  (0.020) (0.054) (0.054) (0.080)  (0.065)  (0.114)  (0.052)  (0.076) 
Number of   0.030  0.012  -0.118*  -0.082  0.098  0.211  -0.080  0.206** 
children    (0.024) (0.068) (0.062) (0.102)  (0.074)  (0.143)  (0.058)  (0.095) 
Employee -0.005  0.030  0.174***  0.226**  -0.035  0.046  0.081  0.225** 
  (0.021) (0.067) (0.058) (0.102)  (0.070)  (0.144)  (0.055)  (0.100) 
Observations  858 298 748 259  740  259  740  259 
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Is trust a proxy for risk aversion?  
The table shows regressions for the effect of trust on the number of stocks (Panel A) and on demand for 
health insurance (Panel B). The first panel reports ordered probit regressions for the number of different 
stocks on which the household invests, excluding equity in his own company. The left hand side variable is 
an integer varying between 0 (no directly held stocks) and n (the household invests in n directly held stocks 
of different companies). In the last column the sample includes only households with strictly positive 
stockholdings. In Panel B the left hand side is a dummy equal to 1 if the household has a private insurance. 
The reported figures are probit estimates calculated as the effect on the LHS of a marginal change in the 
RHS variable computed at the average value of the RHS variables. The last column shows Tobit estimates 
for the amount of health insurance purchased (i.e. the value of the premium paid).   All characteristics are 
those of the household head.  Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *** indicate the coefficient is 
different from zero at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10 % level.  
A. Trust and the number of stocks 
Trust  0.317*** 0.322*** 0.318*** 0.269**  0.278** 
  (0.100) (0.101) (0.102) (0.105)  (0.147) 
Risk  aversion  0.079 0.151 0.152 0.150 -1.038** 
  (0.254) (0.259) (0.259) (0.265) (0.476) 
Ambiguity 
aversion 
  -0.013 -0.013 -0.014 -0.016 
    (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.024) 
Optimism     0.016  0.020  -0.096 
   (0.055)  (0.057)  (0.121) 
Own mutual 
funds 
   0.751***   
    (0.108)   
Financial 
wealth 
0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Income  0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 -0.052 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.037) 
Male  0.239* 0.247* 0.247* 0.220  0.280 
  (0.144) (0.144) (0.144) (0.147) (0.282) 
Age  -0.021* -0.019* -0.021* -0.016  0.025 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.023) 
Age  square  0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000  -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Household 
size 
-0.094 -0.097 -0.097 -0.109 -0.145 
  (0.124) (0.124) (0.124) (0.127) (0.222) 
Number of 
children 
0.227 0.233 0.233 0.249*  0.238 
  (0.145) (0.145) (0.145) (0.149) (0.254) 
High school 
education 
0.177 0.185 0.180 0.223 -0.147 
  (0.135) (0.136) (0.136) (0.140) (0.264) 
College 
education 
0.259* 0.263* 0.256* 0.262* 0.041 
  (0.144) (0.144) (0.146) (0.150) (0.272) 
Employee  -0.042 -0.035 -0.039 -0.083 -0.232 
  (0.142) (0.142) (0.143) (0.146) (0.269) 
Observations  1156 1156 1156 1156 162 
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Trust 0.050  0.048  0.043  179.759 
 (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (223.050) 
Risk aversion  -0.126  -0.137*  -0.135*  -773.808 
 (0.079)  (0.080)  (0.080)  (591.815) 
Ambiguity      0.000 0.000 0.188 
aversion    (0.000) (0.000) (0.284) 
Optimism    0.019  178.813 
     (0.016)  (115.943) 
Financial    0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 5.767*** 
wealth  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (1.411) 
Income 1.867  1.852  1.797  6,931.391 
 (2.111)  (2.116)  (2.118)  (17,158.756) 
Male 0.115***  0.115***  0.116***  750.441** 
 (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (305.882) 
Age  -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.013***  -34.931 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (28.967) 
Age square  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.578* 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.334) 
Household   0.005  0.005  0.003  144.074 
size (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.037)  (269.719) 
Number of   0.002  0.002  0.005  -31.349 
children (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.044)  (320.463) 
High school   0.157***  0.156***  0.151***  451.967 
education (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.041)  (294.534) 
College   0.249***  0.249***  0.241***  986.477*** 
education (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.047)  (318.290) 
Employee 0.126***  0.126***  0.122***  71.651 
 (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.042)  (313.147) 
Observations  1156 1156 1156 1156 
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The role of personalized trust 
The table shows the effect of personalized trust on the participation in risky assets and the share invested in 
risky assets. Personalized trust is the trust a person has towards his bank official. In the first column the left-
hand side variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the person invests in risky assets (directly held stocks, stock 
mutual funds, corporate bonds, derivatives); in the second and third is the share of financial wealth invested 
in these assets. “Risk averse” is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the interviewed answered (2) Risk is an 
uncertain event from which one should seek protection” instead of (1) Risk is an uncertain event from 
which one can extract a profit to the question of the individual chooses (2).  All characteristics are those of 
the respondent. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *** indicate the coefficient is different from zero 
at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10 % level.  
 
    Probit for ownership of 
risky assets 
Share invested in 
risky assets (Tobit 
regression  
Conditional share 
(second stage 
Heckman) 
High personalized trust  0.1610*** 
(0.000) 
0.0653*** 
(0.002) 
0.0156 
(0.280) 
Medium personalized  
trust  
0.0580 
(0.121) 
0.0226 
(0.431) 
0.0011 
(0.955) 
Averse to risk  -0.04* 
(0.025) 
-0.0883*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0730*** 
(0.000) 
Financial wealth  0.0010*** 
(0.000) 
0.0001*** 
(0.000) 
0.00002*** 
(0.000) 
Male  0.1050*** 0.0753***  - 
Age  0.0219*** 0.0144*** 0.0073*** 
Age squared   -0.0002*** -0.0001*** -0.00006*** 
Education  0.0221*** 0.0138***   
Observations 1,834  1,834  1,834 
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The effect of Trust on Firms' Ownership Structure 
 The dependent variable is an indicator variable taking value one if a firm has a single shareholder owning all 
the shares. The sample is a cross-section of Italian manufacturing firms with at least 10 employees. Trust is 
an indicator of social capital at the local level devised by Putnam (1993). It is the average participation to 
national referendums, measured at the provincial level. Judicial inefficiency is the number of years it takes to 
complete a first-degree trial in the local courts. All the regressions contain the following control variables 
(not reported): firm age (computed as 1994 minus the year of foundation), its growth rate in sales, its 
leverage (ratio of debt to total assets), return on assets, indicator variables for whether the firm belongs to a 
group, is incorporated, has a number of employees below the median value, and has its major competitors 
located in the same area. The reported coefficients are probit estimates of the effect of a marginal change in 
the corresponding regressor on the probability of having just one shareholder, computed at the sample mean 
of the independent variables. The standard errors reported in parentheses and are corrected for the potential 
clustering of the residual at the provincial level. 
  
     
Trust -0.394***  -0.468***  -0.394*** 
  ( 0.152 )  ( 0.167 )  ( 0.157 ) 
North -0.023  -0.015   
  ( 0.017 )  ( 0.017 )   
South 0.021  -0.029   
  ( 0.030 )  ( 0.028 )   
Judicial inefficiency    -0.039  -0.028  -0.026 
  ( 0.029 )  ( 0.030 )  ( 0.029 ) 
Judicial inefficiency   0.003  0.004  0.004 
Squared  ( 0.004 )  ( 0.004 )  ( 0.004 ) 
Per capita GDP   0.324  0.319  0.286 
  ( 0.402 )  ( 0.483 )  ( 0.420 ) 
Pseudo-R2     0.105  0.104  0.105 
Observations  3,268 3,268 3,268 
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Trust, stock market participation and ownership concentration around the world   
 
  % stock market cap  
closely held 
% population participating in the stock 
market 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Trust (WVS)  -42.65** 
(0.023) 
-46.80*** 
(0.01) 
-46.84 *** 
(0.01) 
0.272** 
(0.041) 
0.399*** 
(0.001) 
0.390 *** 
(0.000) 
Legal 
Enforcement 
 -23.95* 
(0.074) 
-21.68 
(0.20) 
  0.246*** 
(0.003) 
0.143* 
(0.08) 
Common Law      -1.92 
(0.82) 
   0.091** 
(0.02) 
Observations  33 33 33  24 23 23 
R-squared  0.15 0.24 0.25  0.18 0.50 0.62 
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